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China's Search for Cultural and
National Identity from the
Nineteenth Century to the Present
Werner Meissner
1 This article describes and analyses crucial elements of cultural and national identity-
building  in  China  from  the  nineteenth  century  to the  present,  in  particular  the
response of China’s intellectual elite to Western influences. In this context, I will first
touch briefly on similar phenomena in other regions, such as Russia, the Arabic world,
and Germany. By doing so, I hope to show that what happened in China was, and is, not
an isolated case but typical of modernising societies. 
2 Secondly,  after  a  brief  description  of  the  term  “Chinese  cultural  identity”,  the
unfolding of the identity crisis in China following its continuous defeats by Western
powers  in  the  nineteenth  century  will  be  described.  The  third  part  of  the  article
outlines the attempts of China’s intellectual elite to develop a new cultural and national
identity after the decline of Chinese Marxism-Leninism. The article deals with the main
currents of identity-building and the perception of the West by discussing the rising
importance of Confucianism, the role of history and language, and the renaissance of
Western thought.
3 Finally, the focus will shift to the emergence of different types of Chinese nationalism
as a response to Western imperialism: Anti-Manchuism at the end of the nineteenth
century, the nationalism of Sun Yat-sen and his followers, the state-nationalism of the
Chinese communists until 1979, and the discourse on nationalism since the 1980s.
Discourses on cultural and national identity
4 Identity has become a paradigm for the individual and for groups and nations in their
search for safe ground in disturbed times. The term is defined in its most general form
by Erikson: “the term identity expresses … a mutual relation in that it connotes both a
persistent  sameness  within oneself  (selfsameness)  and a  persistent  sharing of  some
kind  of  essential  character  with  others.”1 Thus,  individual  identities  can  only  be
established  within  group  identities.  Each  person  has  multiple  collective  identities,
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which can be defined through gender, kinship, space or territory (local and regional
identity), class, education, occupation, institution, religion, ethnicity, race, culture and,
finally, nationality and supra-nationality.2 
5 Individual and national identities are not static, but are changing continuously. Each
individual,  group and nation always tries to redefine his/her/its identity when it  is
challenged, endangered or broken. This is understood as an identity crisis. The search
for  and  redefinition  of  a  new  identity  is  a  process  of  adaptation,  in  which  a  new
equilibrium is sought between traditional elements and new challenges. The identity
crisis is solved as soon as a new equilibrium, however temporary, is achieved.
6 Discourses  on  cultural  and  national  identity  have  been  part  of  nation-building  in
Western Europe since the eighteenth century. They can also be found in Russia and
Germany  in  the  nineteenth  century.  Outside  of  Europe,  they  started  dominating
intellectual  debates  in  Asia  as  soon  as  it  was  threatened  by  Western  powers  and
Western ideas, but also in the Arabic world. It was a discourse on modernity, which at
first began in the European states, and then, as a response to Western imperialism,
continued until  today in  those  parts  of  the  world  that  were  or  still  are  under  the
influence of Western powers. 
7 I would like to mention three examples that show similar patterns to those found in
China.  The  first  is  Russia,  where  there  was  a  discourse  between  “Slavophiles”  and
“Westernisers” from the 1840s to the 1870s (and again today). The Slavophiles wanted
Russia’s future development to be based on values and institutions derived from the
country’s early history instead of from the West. They took their ideas mainly from
German philosophy, especially German Idealism (Herder, Schelling, Fichte and Hegel).
The  two  main  founders  of  the  Slavophile  movement,  Khomyakov  (1804-1860)  and
Aksakov (1817-1860), thought that Russia should not use Western Europe as a model for
its modernisation, but should follow a course determined by its own values and history.
Western Europe, especially Britain and France, was viewed as morally bankrupt and
Western liberalism and capitalism as outgrowths of a decaying society.  The Russian
people,  by  contrast,  should  adhere  to  the  Russian  Orthodox  faith  and  unite  in  a
“Christian  community” under  authoritarian  rule.  Spiritual  values  should  replace
Western rationalism, materialism, individualism, capitalism and liberal democracy. The
Slavophiles were opposed by the Westernisers, a group that developed simultaneously
with  them  and  which  insisted  that  Russia  should  imitate  the  Western  pattern  of
modernisation and introduce constitutional government into the tsarist autocracy.
8 A second example is Germany. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the German
“Bildungselite”  developed  the  foundations  of  a  German  national  identity  that  was
separate from the western part of Europe. Many German intellectuals rejected the ideas
of the French Revolution and, further stimulated by its excesses and the subsequent
Napoleonic Wars, developed an anti-Western mindset. Moreover, the emerging political
liberalism was weakened in Germany following the failure of the 1848 revolution. As a
corollary,  political  modernisation  and  industrialisation  did  not  progress  in  a
synchronic way. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the traditional political
and socio-cultural structures were not transformed during the rapid industrialisation.
To some extent, industrialisation was stuck onto the existing state and society.3 The
Prussian landed aristocrats, the German army officer corps, and the state bureaucracy
clearly  tried  to  dodge  any  attempts  at  political  reform.  The  political  and  social
development, in particular the formation of a liberal, parliamentarian constitutional
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state, therefore lagged behind the technical and economic developments. The majority
of the cultural and political elite did not regard itself as part of the “West”; on the
contrary, its aim was to create a strong and authoritarian nation-state, based on an
ethnic German national and cultural identity, in opposition to Western European ideas
of liberalism and parliamentarianism.4 
9 German  Idealism,  Romanticism,  and  historicism  had  always  stressed  the  particular
individuality  of  German intellectual  life  in  the  face  of  the  cultures  of  the  Western
European nations. Together with the idea of the special role of German culture, these
elements were merged into a defensive ideology against the ideas of Western European
and American parliamentarianism and political liberalism in the field of politics; the
dominating role of empiricism, pragmatism and positivism in the field of philosophy;
and against capitalism in the field of economics.
10 Finally,  in  the  Arab  world,  there  was  (and  still  is)  the  struggle  between  clerical
conservatives―or even fundamentalists―and modernists. Since the seventh century,
some Muslims currents have believed in the superiority of their culture over all other
cultures. But with the rise of the West, Islam lost its sense of superiority, and the crisis
in modern Islam has led to the emergence of a “defence-culture” (the consequences of
which can still  be felt  today).  The ideas of Egyptian theologians Muhammad Abduh
(1849-1905) and Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) here exhibit a pattern comparable with the
Russian and German example. They wanted to modernise Arab societies based on Islam
and the Koran. They too, did not accept the concept of Western culture, but they did
accept the technical-scientific  aspects of  Western modernity,  a pattern that Bassam
Tibi  once  described  as  a  “dream  of  half  modernity.”  In  other  words,  to  face  the
challenge, it was necessary only to adopt and develop modern technology, but not its
cultural aspects (the “project of cultural modernity” by Habermas).5 
11 Generalisations in history are always dangerous. The deeper one looks into each single
case,  the  more  differences  will  be  found.  But  despite  many differences,  the  above-
mentioned patterns can be found in nearly all modernising societies in the past, not
only in Russia, Germany and the Arabic world, but also in China. In all of these cases,
intellectuals  and  politicians  claimed  the  superiority  of  their  allegedly  “spiritual
culture” (the Christian faith, Islam, the German spirit and, in China, Song-Ming Neo-
Confucianism) over the so-called rationalist  and “material  civilisation” of  the West,
whereas  their  opponents  favoured  a  political  philosophy  that  was  based  on  a
utilitarian-rational  worldview  with  the  idea  of  a  democratic  representative
government.
12 Nations  that  suffered  from  Western  oppression,  occupation,  and/or  expropriation
tended to move to and fro between extreme ideological orientations: either fending off
Western modernity  or  selectively  integrating  parts  of  it  into  their  own,  frequently
overdrawn, traditional worldviews, or even dismissing their own culture in part or in
whole and replacing it with radical ideologies such as Marxism-Leninism. This is also
true  for  China.  Since  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century,  large  parts  of  China’s
political and intellectual elite have followed similar patterns to find an answer to the
“Western threat”, whether it was based on a Confucian or, later, on a Marxist-Leninist
tradition. 
In search of cultural identity
13 Although Chinese intellectuals differ on how to respond to the Western challenge, more
or less all who have dealt with Chinese history in one way or another agree on certain
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aspects, which they regard as parts of Chinese cultural and national identity (perhaps
with the exception of the early Marxists). Among these main aspects are: 
• the long history of China―at least four to five thousand years;
• the identity of the Han people as the descendents of the legendary Yellow Emperor;
• the continuity of the idea of a Chinese Empire running through all dynastic changes and
foreign rule;
• the uniqueness of the Chinese language;
• the tradition of religion and philosophy (or Chinese thought); 
• Chinese literature, poetry, painting, ceramics, music, etc.;
• the impressive number of inventions in areas such as medicine, weaponry, shipbuilding,
porcelain, etc, which in many cases were unsurpassed until the Renaissance; and 
• despite many regional varieties, a common everyday culture, including Chinese food.
14 At the beginning, this self-perception was not so much an ethnic one – belonging to the
Han race―as a cultural one, belonging to the Chinese “Kulturkreis” (culture area), a
Chinese  culturalism.  Chinese  culture  was  so  attractive  that  it  led  to  a  long-lasting
predominance over the nations and tribes that surrounded it. This predominance, and
the feeling of being superior to other nations, was an additional aspect of the identity
that had developed over the centuries. 
15 The loss of China’s traditional hegemony in Asia, when tribute states such as Annam,
Siam, Burma, Laos and Korea became Western or Japanese colonies, and the so-called
“unequal treaties,” by which the Western powers forced their conditions upon China,
were  felt  to  be  a  deep  humiliation  (xiuru羞辱).  Later  this  humiliation  was  even
“instilled  into  the  pupil’s  mind”6 to  arouse  nationalistic  feelings.  This  feeling  of
humiliation became part of China’s national identity.
16 China’s defeat in the Opium War in 1840 was the beginning of a perennial identity crisis
among intellectuals that lasts until today. The crisis caused by the West was different
from the previous crises of the Chinese Empire, such as the occupation by the Mongols
and later the Manchus, and could not be met with the same response―the assimilation
and  acculturation  of  the  “barbarians,”  who  finally  became  Chinese.  Although  the
Manchu  emperors  never  questioned  the  cultural  identity  of  the  Chinese  educated
elite―on the contrary, they promoted it in many ways because they needed it to rule
China―the West challenged the essence of Chinese culture and the fundamentals of the
elite’s self-perception. 
17 China’s  search  for  a  response  to  the  Western  threat  unfolded  roughly  within  five
periods.
The first period 
18 The first period lasted from the middle of the nineteenth century until 1895. During
this time, the classic paradigm was “Chinese learning as essence (or substance), and
Western learning for application (or as) function” (Zhongxue weiti, xixue weiyong 中學為
體，西學為用). This slogan meant a selective adoption of Western civilisation, namely
its technological and scientific aspects for technical application only, whereas “Chinese
learning,” the traditional Chinese culture, was to remain the essence of individual life,
society and state. The Western threat was reduced to the problem that China would
only have to “learn from the superiority of the foreigners in order to rein in their
superiority” (Zhang Zhidong, 1837-1909).
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19 As a result, the political elite started building a modern arms industry and laying the
foundations  of  the  industrialisation  of  the  empire  by  establishing  arsenals,  mines,
railways, etc. The aims of these modernisation policies, which ran from 1861 to 1894
under the slogans, “Movement for self-strengthening” (ziqiang yundong 自強運動) and “
Yangwu movement 洋務運動” (in which yangwu stands for foreign affairs), were: 
• the protection of the threatened territorial integrity of the Chinese Empire; 
• the protection of the predominant role of Chinese culture against the allegedly subversive
influence of Western ideas; and
• the conservation of the existing Confucian system of rule in the interests of the political and
social elites.
20 This conservative or partial modernisation failed, as we know. The factories that were
established did not function properly, and in 1894 China lost the next war, this time
with  Japan,  which  had  started  out  on  the  road  not  only  of  economic,  but  also  of
political, reform through the introduction of a constitutional monarchy.
The second period
21 During the second period (1895-1911), a different pattern emerged. Intellectuals, such
as  Kang Youwei  (1858-1927),  Liang  Qichao  (1873-1929),  and Tan Sitong (1865-1898),
recognised that  it  was not  sufficient  merely to  adopt Western technology,  but  that
political reform was also necessary. However, for the leading reformer, Kang, a radical
break with tradition was not conceivable. Instead, he looked to the Confucian classics
to find an answer to the Western challenge. In his article “Confucius as Reformer,”
(Kongzi gaizhikao 孔子改製考) published in 1897, he presented the idea that the great
master  had  himself  been  an  adherent  of  institutional  change.  Under  the  slogan,
“changing the institutions based on the teachings of the old times” (tuogu gaizhi 托古改
製), Kang attempted to win the necessary ideological legitimisation for political change
by  returning  to  a  reformed Confucianism.  In  his  memoranda  to  the  emperor,  who
appointed him as his adviser in 1898, he recommended a series of reforms, which aimed
to bring about three important changes:
• the abolition of the traditional Sino-centrist worldview and the acknowledgement of foreign
powers as states enjoying equal rights;
• the equality of Chinese and Western learning (Kang demanded the introduction of
educational institutions following a Western pattern and the founding of a university in
Beijing, later called Beida); and
• the transformation of the empire into a constitutional monarchy.
22 The “Hundred Days Reforms” in 1898 foundered, partly because of the hastiness with
which they were implemented and partly  because of  the resistance of  conservative
court circles. Nevertheless, it is evident that Kang Youwei and his reformers clearly
recognised one thing: the adoption of Western technology alone was not sufficient to
rescue  the  existing  political  system  or  even  China.  For  the  first  time,  Chinese
intellectuals acknowledged the equality of Chinese and Western learning.
The third period 
23 The third period covers the first republic from 1911 to 1949. In my view, this period is
the most important. Neither before nor since have Chinese intellectuals discussed so
thoroughly and comprehensively Western ideas and Chinese culture. As in a prism, one
can find all political groups from the right to the left and their respective attempts to
find an answer to China’s pressing problems. Four main groups emerged. 
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24 Confucians,  such  as  Gu  Hongming  (1827-1928),  a  long-time  subordinate  of  Zhang
Zhidong  and  trenchant  critic  of  Westernisation,  and  Zhang  Junmai  (Carsun  Chang,
1887-1969), an adherent of Neo-Confucianism, a strongly idealistic and mystical form of
Confucianism that goes back to Zhu Xi (1130-1200) and Wang Yangming (1472-1528). Gu
accused  the  radical  intellectuals  of  betraying  China  and  destroying  the  oldest
civilisation in the world. To him, European civilisation was a “material monster” that
was going to destroy Chinese civilisation like a “Trojan horse” from within.7 On the
other side, China’s civilisation was superior, because it was “spiritual” (jingshen), and
should  help  the  West  to  free  itself  from the  ideology of  “materialism.”  Zhang also
believed in the superiority of  China’s  “spiritual  culture” (jingshen wenhua 精神文化)
over the “material culture” (wuzhi wenhua 物質文化) of the West, especially as far as
the  mechanistic  natural  sciences  were  concerned.  In  this  context,  he  already
distinguished between Germany and the West  and favoured a  selective adoption of
science, Western idealist philosophy, in particular German Idealism, and the German
model of social and economic development.8
25 Nationalists around Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925) and his party, the Guomindang. Sun tried to
synthesise the Confucian tradition with Western political liberalism in his main work,
Sanminzhuyi 三民主義 (Three People’s Principles). He too was convinced that China’s
culture was superior, but was ready to introduce Western democratic institutions in
China as part of a national government. 
26 Liberal  thinkers such as Hu Shi  (1891-1962),  who had been influenced by American
pragmatism (John Dewey). In contrast to the Neo-Confucians, they were convinced that
only the “scientification” of Chinese thought in all areas―i.e., not just in technology,
but also in the social sciences and humanities―and the “total Westernisation” (quanpan
xihua  全盤西化)  of  Chinese  civilisation,  connected  with  the  adoption  of  political
liberalism  and  a  controlled  capitalism,  would  bring  about  the  re-establishment  of
China’s greatness.9 Hu Shi,  under the influence of John Dewey, was also the first to
recommend a federal political structure for China based on “self governing provinces”
(liansheng zizhi 聯省自治), rather than a centralised political system.10 
27 Marxists, such as Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao, Mao, and others, who looked at the Soviet
Union as a model for China. They aimed to destroy Chinese “feudal” culture, especially
Confucianism (dadao kongjiao 打倒孔教) and establish a new socialist identity based on
Marxism-Leninism.
28 These  groups  clashed  in  numerous  controversies,  starting  with  the  “May  Fourth
Movement”  in  1919;  the  controversy  over  “East  West  culture”  and  “Science  and
Metaphysics”  in  the  early  1920s;  and  over  “Westernisation”  in  the  1930s.  In  these
discourses, China’s cultural tradition became an essential part of national identity. The
educated elite realised that it was necessary to create a national language to protect
China’s  culture,  to  develop national  education,  and,  if  possible,  even to  prove  that
science,  through which the West  had demonstrated its  superiority,  had its  roots in
China as well. Only by a thorough overhaul of China’s culture and institutions, was it
possible  to  cope  with  the  Western  threat.  Linguists,  educators,  historians,
archaeologists,  artists,  and scientists:  they all  became the architects of  China’s  new
cultural  and national  identity.  Here I  will  touch briefly on the sciences only.  Other
areas,  such as  sociology,  philosophy,  religion,  language  and literature  show similar
patterns regarding their role in the search for cultural identity.
Sciences
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29 Chinese scholars frequently mention the “Four Great Inventions” (si da faming 四大發
明: compass, paper, gunpowder and printing) as examples of the high level of Chinese
civilisation in many fields. How did Chinese intellectuals get along with the fact that
the Western sciences were superior? Conservatives simply declared that all Western
sciences were of Chinese origin (Xi xue zhong yuan 西學中原) and that one should adopt
only those aspects that could already be found in China. By pointing to the Chinese
origin of  Western sciences,  superiority over the West  was maintained.  At  the same
time,  this  attitude  facilitated  the  adoption of  modern sciences  and technology  and
made  it  easier  to  acknowledge  their  temporary  superiority,  simply  because  they,
allegedly, originally came from China. However, during this process of adoption, the
Chinese scientific tradition was classified by Western categories of natural and social
sciences and partly reinterpreted. The setting up of modern disciplines, especially in
the 1920s and 1930s, was paralleled by intensive research on Chinese precedents and by
an  attempt  to  link  up  Western  sciences  with  Chinese  tradition.  By  doing  so,
intellectuals hoped to develop a genuine identity as Chinese scientists. 
30 This attitude was common to conservatives, liberals and Marxists. Hu Shi, for example,
who was perhaps the most “Westernised” literary scholar and who had initiated the
“literary  revolution”,  looked  for  the  roots  of  science  in  China.  Together  with  the
reformer Liang Qichao, he believed that the scholars of the early Qing dynasty, such as
Gu  Yanwu  (1613-1683),  Huang  Zongxi  (1610-1695),  and  Dai  Zhen  (1724-1777),  best
represented the scientific tradition. In their view, these scholars had used empirical
methods in their research on history, philology and phonetics that could easily match
Western sciences. A second example was Ding Wenjiang (1887-1937), the well-known
geologist  who  had  studied  in  London  and  had  been  Director-General  of  Greater
Shanghai in the1920s. Ding regarded the famous geographer Xu Xiake (1586-1641) and
his research as a precedent of modern Western geography. The general view was that
to revive China’s great tradition in science and technology, it was only necessary to link
up the empirical tradition of the Qing period with modern science. Whether Hu, Liang
and Ding were right in their assumption does not matter here. I think they exaggerated
a bit,  but the most important aspect here was that they tried to bring Chinese and
Western knowledge together and to present them as one part of the world’s common
knowledge  and  wisdom:  we,  the  Chinese,  take  part  in  the  global  emergence  of  a
scientific world community, bringing our own achievements.11
Westernisation
31 The discourse on science, but also on liberalism, the European enlightenment, and the
future  model  of  the  Chinese  state,  was  embedded  in  the  general  discourse  on
Westernisation (xihua 西化). The dispute about the supposed necessity to Westernise or
about the similarly asserted necessity to take one's own path independently of the West
became the red thread of  all  discussions.  These were not  limited to  the 1920s,  but
continued in the 1930s (and returned in the 1980s).
32 From 1933 to 1935, there took place among Chinese sociologists an up to now largely
disregarded  controversy  on  “Total  Westernisation”  (quanpanxihua).  Among  the
adherents of Westernisation were Chen Xujing (1903-?), a professor of sociology and
political science at Lingnan University in Canton, as well as other scholars, such as Lu
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Guanwei, Feng Enrong and Lü Xiehai, also at Lingnan University. The main arguments
of the “Westernisers” in the 1930s were: 
• the uniformity of culture and the interdependence of all of its aspects (politics, philosophy,
the economy and social institutions); 
• the superiority of Western culture and the idea that the old Chinese culture was not suited
to the modern world; 
• Westernisation as a general, world-embracing trend, with the idea that if China wanted to
have an influential place in the world, then it must Westernise itself; and 
• that certain parts of Chinese culture were already Westernised, but only externally (i.e., the
system of government, the traffic system, industry) and that this Westernisation was not
only insufficient but also dangerous, because it concentrated only on the material
achievements of the West and neglected the spiritual foundations of Western society that
were the basis of these achievements.12
33 Among  the  opponents  of  Westernisation  were  the  Neo-Confucian  scholars  Zhang
Junmai and Liang Shuming (1893-1988), to name only two. To Zhang, it was necessary
to connect  the Chinese (special)  path (dao 道)  with Western instruments (qi  器),  to
preserve the national characteristics (guoqing 國情), and to shape Chinese culture on a
Chinese foundation (Zhongguo benwenhua 中國本文化).
34 Chinese scholars also made a very clear distinction between the West and Germany.
Germany  was  not  perceived  as  belonging  to  the  West.  Many  opponents  of
Westernisation,  especially  the  modern Neo-Confucian camp,  regarded Germany―its
culture,  its  policy  of  state-guided  modernisation  since  Bismarck,  and  its  education
system―as a model for China’s rebirth. In their search for ideological allies against the
West, the Confucians of the 1920s and 1930s looked above all to Germany (whereas the
Chinese  communists  looked to  Russia,  and the  liberals  to  America).  They hoped to
revive  the  Confucian  and  spiritual  tradition  by  integrating  German  metaphysics,
primarily  the  philosophy  of  Kant,  Hegel  and  Fichte.13 Chinese  and  German (mostly
conservative)  intellectuals  even  envisaged  some  kind  of  cultural  co-operation  in
addition to  the already very close  military and economic co-operation of  the time.
German idealistic  philosophy and Chinese  philosophy should unite  against  Western
civilisation.  Translation  projects  (German  philosophical  works  into  Chinese  and
Chinese philosophical works into German) were started with exactly this purpose in
mind, among them, of course, Fichte’s famous “Reden an die deutsche Nation”. The
Chinese translation was published on the occasion of Japan's occupation of Manchuria.
14 More than 1,300 German-language books had been translated into Chinese by the
beginning  of  the  Second  World  War,  the  majority  of  them  works  on  culture  and
philosophy.15 This discourse slowed down in the late 1930s, due to two major events:
the Chinese-Japanese War and the looming victory of the Chinese communists in the
civil war after 1945.
The fourth period 
35 The fourth period, from 1949 to 1978, was characterised by the attempt to create a
cultural and national identity based on Marxism-Leninism. After the establishment of
the new Chinese central state, Marxism-Leninism, in combination with the thought of
Mao Zedong, became the new state-orthodoxy. The new political class legitimised its
claim to  absolute  power  by  Marxism-Leninist  doctrine.  This  “New Philosophy”  (xin
zhexue 新哲學) provided an official identity for the individual and the nation, and the
followers  of  other  intellectual  currents,  such  as  Western  liberalism,  positivism,
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pragmatism, idealism, religion and traditional Chinese thought, were frequently forced
out of their positions and persecuted. On might say that Marxism-Leninism served as
the new ti 體 (substance), whereas modern science and technology were again regarded
as yong 用 (function).
36 The period between 1949 and 1978 can be regarded as a period of the far-reaching
dismissal  of  European  and  Chinese  culture  at  the  same  time.  The  Party  tried  to
eradicate Western influence with the exception of the natural sciences and Marxism. It
also tried to root out so-called Chinese “feudal” culture. However, the Party obviously
failed in its attempts to impose a cultural and national identity based on communist
ideology upon the Chinese people.
The fifth period
37 Following the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in 1978, at which Deng
Xiaoping’s reform policy was initiated, the fifth and, so far the latest, period began. It
was characterised by three important developments: 
• the renaissance of Confucianism; 
• the renaissance of Western thought; and 
• the emergence of various nationalist movements in the Chinese-speaking area.
The renaissance of Confucianism
38 In most post-Leninist countries, we can observe a renaissance of traditionalist thought
that is frequently linked to nationalistic and ethnic or even racist tendencies. Strong
tendencies towards re-traditionalisation can be observed in non-communist countries
too―in  particular  in the Islamic world,  where anti-Western movements  are on the
advance―but also in the United States, so speaking of a global phenomenon is justified.
39 The  renaissance  of  Confucianism  started  around  1986  under  the  guidance  of  the
Communist  Party,  when the then member of  the state council,  Gu Mu,  became the
chairman of the newly founded Confucian society.16 Furthermore, between 1986 and
1989,  more  then  300  articles  were  published  on  modern  Neo-Confucianism  alone,
represented by Feng Youlan (Feng Yu-lan), Tang Junyi (T’ang Chün-yi), Mou Zongsan
(Mou Tsung-san),  and Du Weiming (Tu Wei-ming).  Since then, numerous studies on
Confucianism and Taoism have been published. A further indication of this revival were
three international  symposiums on Confucianism at  the beginning of  October 1989.
More than 300 scientists  and adherents  of  Confucianism came together,  some even
from  Taiwan.  This  happened  only  three  months  after  the  crackdown  on  the  pro-
democracy movement. Obviously, the adherents of Confucianism were not offended by
the suppression of the student movement.
40 The  speeches  delivered  by  high  cadres  Jiang  Zemin,  Gu  Mu  and  others  at  the
symposiums  revealed  that  the  political  leadership  clearly  functionalised  traditional
concepts to broaden its dwindling legitimisation after June 4th.17 Confucianism became
part  of  a  traditionalist  cultural  nationalism and an instrument  to  counter  Western
political influence. One year later, at an international congress in November 1990 in
Beijing, Zhu Xi, the founder of Neo-Confucianism in the twelfth century and once the
ideological archenemy of the Chinese communists, was finally rehabilitated.
41 There  is  no  doubt  that  the  renaissance  of  Confucian  thought  helps  to  solve  the
problems  of  cultural  identity  that  necessarily  arise  during  rapid  modernisation.
However,  similar  to  the intellectual  situation in  the 1920s  and 1930s,  modern Neo-
Confucianism  also  shows  a  tendency  against  Western  political  liberalism.  For  the
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Chinese  Communist  Party,  the  revival  of  Confucianism  in  the  1990s  served  a  dual
purpose.  Confucianism  implies  order,  obedience  to  one’s  superior,  devotion  to  the
state, and the protection of the family. It puts the interests of the group above the
interests of the individual, and thus helps to promote social harmony and stability. Its
authoritarian aspects  can be  used to  build  a  “socialist  spiritual  civilisation” and to
promote social harmony. At the same time, Confucianism can help to provide people
with some sort of national identity and to defend Chinese culture against the so-called
threat of Westernisation.18 A “National Confucianism” can serve as a bulwark against
the ideological impact of the West following rapid modernisation.19 The international
symposium in Xi’an,  also in November 1990,  on China’s  modernisation and Chinese
traditional culture, obviously not only re-established Confucianism as a means to check
the  social  and  political  effects  of  modernisation,  but  also  as  a  part  of  a  national
ideology.20 
The rewriting of history
42 Parallel to the renaissance of Confucianism began the rewriting of Chinese history that
started slowly in the 1980s and accelerated after 1989. One example is the re-evaluation
of former national heroes such as Zeng Guofan (1811-1872), the governor-general and
first  moderniser;  Li  Hongzhang (1823-1901),  the  second great  moderniser;  Lin  Zexu
(1785-1850), who drove the British out of Canton; Guo Songtao (1818-1890), the first
ambassador to Britain; and even General Yue Fei (1103-1142), a national hero of the
Southern  Song  Dynasty. I  will  focus  here  on  Zeng  only.  In  1993,  a  three-volume
historical novel about Zeng was published and reprinted 19 times within two years,
with  more  than  two  million  copies  sold.  An  encyclopaedia  of  Zeng  Guofan  was
published in 2000, and the number of articles and books about him is rising.21 
43 Throughout modern Chinese history, Zeng has been regarded as a model of national
salvation and nation building. Liang Qichao, Yuan Shikai and Chiang Kai-shek praised
him as a national hero who had helped to preserve the Chinese “race” and state. Only
Sun Yat-sen was critical of Zeng, because he had supported the Manchus, but even Mao
Zedong admired him before Marxist historians labelled him as a “traitor of the Han”
(hanjian  漢奸).  In  their  view,  Zeng was a  “lackey” because he served the Manchus.
Moreover, his modernisation policy allegedly only served Western interests.22 
44 There are several reasons why Zeng is now held in high esteem. Firstly, he was a great
moderniser and reformer, not a revolutionary. Secondly, his modernisation policy was
based  on  Confucianism. Thirdly,  he  defeated  the  Taipings  (once  regarded  as  the
precursors  of  the  Chinese  communist  revolution),  who  were  Christians  (a  Western
religion),  and had attacked Confucianism. Finally,  he defeated a political  movement
that  was  based  on  the  peasantry.  Understandably,  to  many  historians,  Zeng
safeguarded Chinese culture and “Chineseness,”  which were under threat from two
sides: Christianity from the outside and peasant uprisings, which were from the inside,
but which had allegedly been hijacked by outside forces. Zeng thus becomes a symbol of
resistance against Westernisation (from the outside) and revolution (from the inside). 
45 One can speak of a paradigmatic shift in the perception of national history that has had
deep repercussions with respect to national identity and domestic politics. As a result,
Marxist-Leninist historiography seems to be in retreat. The rehabilitation of Zeng puts
into question the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party as a representative of the
peasantry  and the  proletariat.  Peasant  movements  are  not  regarded as  progressive
forces  anymore,  and the period since  1911 is  seen as  an aberration of  China’s  real
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history. Cultural identity means turning to the roots of China’s culture, and dismissing
the West and social uprisings. The self-image of the Chinese Communist Party is here at
stake. 
Language
46 The rewriting of history after 1979 cannot be separated from another aspect of Chinese
cultural  identity:  language.  Cultural  nationalists  around the renowned International
Chinese  Character  Research  Association  and  its  main  organ,  “Chinese  Character
Culture” (Hanzi wenhua 漢字文化, CCC), believe that the old characters (fantizi 繁體字)
are an essential part of Chinese culture and identity. Chinese linguists, such as Shen
Xiaolong, Xu Jialu, Ji Jin, and Xiao Tianzhu, even claim that ideographs are superior to
phonetic scripts and that Chinese is not only the clearest and most concise language in
the world, but also the easiest to learn. They also claim that Chinese grammar is the
closest to mathematics and may be the best international language. Subsequently, the
“theory of the superiority of Chinese” has replaced the previous “theory of backward
characters.” There is no space here to go into more detail, and I again refer readers to
Guo  Yingjie’s  study.23 However,  there  are  two  more  aspects  that  underline  the
arguments put forward by the linguists, and to which I would like to add.
47 First, Taiwan and Hong Kong have always used fantizi. They have been the two regions
of the Chinese-speaking world that have had the fastest modernisation in Asia (apart
from Japan). The old characters may not have promoted modernisation, but they have
definitely  not  been  an  obstacle  to  it.  They  have  also  not  been  an  obstacle  to
alphabetisation and character learning, as the literacy rate is still higher in Taiwan and
Hong Kong than it is on the Chinese mainland. Therefore, the Party’s policy of language
reform was probably based on wrong assumptions. Secondly, neither Taiwan nor Hong
Kong, nor overseas Chinese communities, will stop using traditional Chinese characters
in the future. Communication and cultural identity building have now become more
complicated due to two different character systems. Thirdly, to build a genuine cultural
and  national  identity,  there  is  no  way  of  getting  around  the  old  characters  when
dealing with historical documents and reading the classics. Finally, and in my personal
view,  Chinese  traditional  characters  are  very  beautiful  and  of  high  aesthetic
value―something that is missing in many of the simplified characters. It would be a
loss to China’s culture and to the aesthetic education of the people if the traditional
characters disappeared from textbooks and from daily life. 
The renaissance of Western thought
48 The renaissance of Western thought is the second important development. Following
the  opening  up  of  the  country,  Chinese  intellectuals  started  translating  numerous
philosophical books and articles on Western philosophy into Chinese and published an
even greater number of their own studies on this topic. There now exists for the first
time  statistical  material  about  Chinese  publications  on  Western  philosophy  over  a
period of 11 years (1987-1997).24 
49 The number of titles during that period is approximately 10,000 (today the figure will
be much higher). They include more than four hundred and fifty translations of books,
approximately seven hundred translations of articles, and approximately six hundred
and fifty books and eight thousand articles by Chinese authors. The titles can be further
divided into three hundred and fifty general introductions and textbooks, nearly seven
hundred studies of comparative philosophy (China and the West), three hundred and
fifty studies of aesthetics, more than three hundred and twenty of ethics, and around
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four hundred and fifty of the philosophy of science and technology, to name only the
largest groups. The figures look even more impressive if one bears in mind that only
titles on Western Marxism have been included (i.e., the Frankfurt School), but no titles
on Chinese Marxism or Marxism-Leninism. 
50 A brief look at the titles provides evidence that Chinese scholars have a strong interest
in European continental philosophy, especially German-language philosophy, but not
as much in Anglo-American philosophy. German philosophy accounts for a large share,
with about one-third of the titles. This is due in part to the fact that after 1949, German
Idealism,  in  particular  Hegel’s  philosophy,  was  able  to  survive  in  the  shadow  of
Marxism-Leninism. Still on top between 1987 and 1997 is Hegel with more than four
hundred  and  sixty  titles,  followed  by  Kant  (437),  Heidegger  (178),  Nietzsche  (174),
Sartre (154), Popper (128), Aristotle (114), Husserl (95), Wittgenstein (93), Plato (87),
Hume (84), Schopenhauer (82), Rousseau (79), Habermas (68), and Gadamer (59). Among
the few Anglo-American thinkers are Rorty (41),  Locke (39),  Quine (30),  Dewey (27),
Rawls (26),  Hobbes (14),  James (12),  Mill  (6),  and Hayek (4).  (All  figures refer to the
period 1987 to 1997.)
51 One major field of interest is comparative studies. There are 650 studies alone of the
differences  between  Western  and  Chinese  philosophy.  Some  focus  on  the  general
differences between the two philosophies and cultures. Others compare Chinese and
Western philosophers, for example, Kong Zi and Meng Zi with Protagoras, Socrates,
Plato, Aristotle, and Kant; Zhuang Zi with Sartre; Xun Zi with Hegel; Lu Jiuyuan with
Berkeley; Zhang Zai with Spinoza; Wang Fuzhi and Yan Yu with Kant; Yan Yuan with
William  James;  Hu  Shi  with  Gadamer;  Zhuang  Zi  with  Nietzsche;  Dai  Zhen  with
Descartes. Several studies investigate the differences between Heidegger and Zhuang
Zi. 
52 The question of the depths of these comparative studies cannot be answered here, but
the figures and titles show a rising tendency among Chinese scholars to investigate the
differences  between  Chinese  and  Western  philosophy  and  to  develop  their  own
standpoint  and  cultural  identity  by  contrasting  Chinese  tradition  with  Western
thought.25 
National identity
53 During  national  crises,  such  as  the  Chinese-Japanese  War  in  the  1930s  and  1940s,
language  and  literature,  science,  pedagogy,  history,  philosophy  and  art  have  been
subsumed  into  nationalist  ideology  and  movements  and  the  discourse  on  national
identity. The overarching ideology of all of these aspects is nationalism and national
identity. Hence, I would like to make a few comments on Chinese nationalism here.
54 Since the 1990s, the amount of literature on Chinese nationalism has grown rapidly. I
mention here only the most important ones: studies by Unger, Dikoetter, Pye, Schubert,
and Hays Gries, and by our Chinese colleagues, Zhao Suisheng, Zheng Yongnian, and
Guo Yingjie, to name only a few. However, having run through the literature regarding
the definition of nationalism, I am still inclined to follow Kohn’s general distinction
between  a  Western,  more  liberal  kind  of  nationalism  (also  called  liberal  or  civic
nationalism) and a Central  and Eastern nationalism (also called ethnic and cultural
nationalism),  to  which  German  nationalism  belonged  until  the  Second  World  War.
Whereas Western nationalism comprised, at least in its origins, the ideas of individual
liberty and rational cosmopolitanism that were current in the eighteenth century, the
emerging  nationalism  in  Asia  tended  towards  a  different  development.  Dependent
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upon, and opposed to, influences from without, this new nationalism was characterised
by an inferiority complex that was often compensated for by over-emphasis and over-
confidence. As Kohn rightly observed: 
“All rising nationalism was influenced by the West … yet this very dependence on
the West often wounded the pride of the native educated class as soon as it began to
develop its own nationalism, and ended in an opposition to the “alien” example and
its liberal and rational outlook.” 26
55 One major reason for this was the cultural hubris, arrogance and, frequently, racism
that  had  become  an  inherent  part of  Western  nationalism  and  imperialism  in  the
nineteenth  and twentieth  centuries.  Therefore,  the  Asian  nationalist  movements
developed in opposition to the West and contained strong cultural, ethnic, and even
racist―but few liberal―elements. Nationalism mainly meant liberation from Western
oppression, not from autocratic rule in one’s own country. National leaders, such as
Sun  Yat-sen  in  China,  Nehru  in  India,  and  Sokarno  in  Indonesia,  developed  their
concepts  of  national  identity  out  of  a  struggle  against  Western  and  Japanese
imperialism. 
56 The first type of Chinese nationalism was ethnic and even racist. Originally, it was a
movement to get rid of the Manchus and went back to the seventeenth century, when
Ming loyalists  such as  Gu Yenwu (1613-1682),  Huang Zongxi  (1610-1695),  and Wang
Fuzhi  (1619-1692)  continued  to  fight  against  the  newly  established  Qing  dynasty
(1644-1911).  Anti-Manchuism, together with anti-imperialism, was also expressed in
the writings of Zhang Binglin (1868-1996),  who regarded China’s penetration by the
West as the biggest threat. To prevent the decline of Chinese culture, the “yellow race”
should unite against the white invaders.27
57 The second nationalist concept, minzuzhuyi 民族主義, was developed by Sun Yat-sen.
Minzuzhuyi is  usually  translated  as  “nationalism .”  However,  this  translation  is  very
vague. The characters minzu clearly indicate a meaning of “race” and “nation”. Min 
means “people”, and zu can be translated as “clan”. In connection with zhong (zhongzu 
种族), it means “race”. Hanzu 漢族  is translated as “Han nationality”. In Sun’s view,
there  are  several  elements  that  contribute  to  nation  building:  above  all,  the  blood
relationship (xuetong 血統), followed by the conditions of life (shenghuo 生活), language
(yuyan 語言), and religion (zongjiao 宗教). According to Sun, the blood relationship is
the  most  important  power  that  constitutes  the  Chinese  nation.28 His  nationalism
(minzuzhuyi) belongs to  the category of  so-called ethnic/cultural  nationalism and is
comparable to the early nationalism of  Germany (Volkstumsidee)29 and some Eastern
European  countries.  Sun  also  stated  that  Chinese  culture  was  superior  to  Western
civilisation, but, at the same time, he strongly emphasised the necessity of adopting
Western science and political institutions. He tried to combine his idea of nationalism
with  the  basic  concepts  of  Western  liberalism,  representative  democracy,  and  the
separation of powers,  and proposed five democratically elected political institutions
(three Western and two Chinese)―the five Yuan―thus offering for  the first  time a
synthesis between Confucian tradition and Western liberal democratic values.30 
58 The  nationalism  of  the  Guomindang  was  very  different  from  the  concept  of
“patriotism” (a term borrowed from the Soviet Union, and, in Chinese, aiguozhuyi 愛國
主義) represented by the Chinese communists, which Mao Zedong mentioned for the
first time in his famous speech on “The Place of the Chinese Communist Party in the
National War” in 1938. 
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59 During the period of Maoist “patriotism”, communist historiography did not regard
classic Chinese culture as an important element of Chinese identity. On the contrary,
the nation was based on classes (class nation),31 the peasantry, the proletariat and the
petty and national bourgeoisie. In the 1980s, after the so-called Cultural Revolution,
when large parts of China’s cultural heritage were destroyed, the Chinese Communist
Party’s approach to culture slowly changed. Step by step, the Party began to reinstate
Chinese culture as an element of Chinese nationalism, together with ethnic aspects and
Confucian ideology. 
60 Patriotism became especially important in the aftermath of June 4th.  The embattled
Party searched for a new legitimisation and developed a two-pronged approach. First,
the Party insisted that patriotism and socialism could not be separated.32 According to
Jiang  Zemin:  “in  China  today,  patriotism  and  socialism  are  unified  in  essence.”
Patriotism is regarded as the premise behind China’s socialism, and socialism is the
inevitable  conclusion of  genuine patriotism.  Second,  the  Party  took the lead in  re-
evaluating China’s  history  and making use  of  traditional  concepts,  such as  cultural
nationalism,33 Confucianism, and even racial nationalism, to promote social stability
and to strengthen its  legitimacy.  The original  patriotism, which had been based on
class structure, was discarded, and the debate on cultural nationalism explored the
concept of “Chinese modernity” as an alternative to Western modernity. Events, such
as  the  Taiwan crisis  (1995-1996)  and  strained  relations  with  the  United  States  and
Japan, played a catalytic role in this debate, as they helped to divert attention from the
real issue of political modernisation to ethnic nationalist emotions. 
61 One  of  the  most  important  aspects  of  the  1990s  was  the  re-emergence  of  racial
nationalism. A brief look at Chinese history reveals that racist thinking has never been
foreign to Chinese politics. In the past, the traditional term “barbarian” could easily be
loaded with racial connotations, as Wang Fuzhi did with reference to the Manchus. The
list of racial stereotypes used by Chinese scholars since the nineteenth century is long.
34 Reformers from Yan Fu to Liang Qichao regarded racial identity as a key element in
China’s struggle for racial survival (baozhong 保种) and rebirth. The “yellow race” was
engaged in a merciless struggle with the “white race.” Chiang Kaishek (Jiang Jieshi)
spoke of the “various stocks” in China not just as one nation, but also as “one race.”35
Darwinism, combined with racism and a belief in China’s cultural superiority, became
the main building blocks of Chinese national identity before 1949. However, one should
always  take  into  consideration  that  this  terminology  was  strongly  influenced  by
European  ideas.  Racism in  Europe  was  in  vogue  at  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth
century, and Chinese intellectuals were by no means alone in applying racial terms and
theories. They took them from the West.36
62 Racial nationalism seems to have become more and more important as an element to
help  establish  collective  identity,  especially  after  1989.  Sautman  has collected
statements  by  high-ranking  Chinese  communist  cadres  that  obviously  reveal  racial
thinking.37 Official  documents  emphasise  the  common  ancestry  of  the  Han  and
minorities. Han and Tibetans are regarded as parts of a common race, and the early
historical  Tibetan  and  Yellow  River  cultures  are  regarded  as  identical.  Tibetans
allegedly  belong to  the  Chinese  nation  through  this  blood  relationship.38These  and
other examples indicate that racial nationalism seems to be on the rise and plays an
important role in the discourse on national identity.
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63 Despite all of the attempts to create a national identity through the revival of tradition
and even racial  thinking, one cannot speak of one Chinese national identity or one
Chinese  nationalism.  Instead,  as  Gladney  has  argued39,  one  can  observe  the
fragmentation of Chinese identity, even among the Han majority, and the emergence of
various regional identities and national movements in the Chinese-speaking area. The
Communist Party is struggling to keep all of these, in some cases centrifugal, forces
under control by utilising traditional cultural, ethnic, and racial elements under the
umbrella of “Socialism with Chinese characteristics.”
64 In addition to the already existing state nationalism or patriotism of the Party, one can
identify the following “nationalisms.” 
• Popular autonomous nationalism, which emerged in the 1990s and surfaced in various
autonomous demonstrations (against the United States and Japan [1999, 2005]) and
publications.40 The government seems to be indifferent to such nationalism, although it
could become dangerous (as in 1919) if the Party does not take the right measures against
Japan or the United States to placate the movement. It is not possible to say in which
political direction this nationalism might head in times of national crisis―whether more
democratic and anti-government or more conservative and anti-foreign. The second option
seems to be more likely.
• Tibetan and Uighur nationalisms, which became stronger in the 1990s. Both are ethnic and
religious movements.41 The first may even contain democratic elements, due to the
personality of the Dalai Lama and the exiled Tibetan elite. The second is clearly ethnic and
religious, either demanding autonomous rights guaranteed under the Constitution or even
independence.
• Taiwanese nationalism. The rehabilitation of Taiwanese culture has favoured the cultural
identity of the Taiwanese and has supported the rise of Taiwanese nationalism in the 1990s.
Though the ethnic aspect is very strong, the synthesis of ethnic and democratic concepts has
created a civic and liberal type of nationalism in a Chinese-speaking area for the first time,
which could be a model for the Chinese mainland too.42
• Democratic nationalism, which is clearly underdeveloped on the mainland. There are a few
scholars who favour democratic nationalism and the introduction of a democratic regime in
China, such as Wu Guoguang, Ding Xueliang and Zheng Yongnian, but none of them teaches
on the mainland.
65 In  view  of  these  different  types  of  nationalism,  it  is  perhaps  better  to  speak  of
“nationalist  movements  in  the  Chinese-speaking  area”  rather  than  of  “Chinese
nationalism,” and of a still troubled Chinese national identity.
Outlook
66 Since  the  1980s,  intellectuals,  as  well  as  the  people,  have  had  the  possibility  of
recovering their cultural past. This is one of the most positive aspects of this period.
For the first time since 1949, Chinese people on the mainland have had the chance to
develop  their  own  identity  by  immersing  themselves  in  their  own  culture  and
simultaneously adapting to modernity.
67 What is the political dimension of these new developments? Are they indicators of a
desirable democratisation of Chinese society in all areas? As desirable as this would be,
skepticism is yet called for, as the following observations show.
1. One  can  observe the  build-up  of  two  main  positions,  both  of  which  might  become  the
dominating political movements in the future and both of which to a certain extent refer to
traditions  in  Chinese  thought.  There  is  not  only  an  extremely  disputed and  officially
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combated tendency towards Westernisation, but, as already seen in the 1920s and 1930s,
there  has  emerged  at  the  same  time  a  counter-tendency  in  the  form  of  a  revival  of
conservative ideologies. 
2. The pro-democracy movement of the 1980s and its theoretical foundations revealed strong
deficiencies regarding socio-political preconditions, as far as the path to a more democratic
and pluralist state in future was concerned. In the following years the partial modernisation
conducted by the government favoured negative developments, such as corruption and the
abuse  of  power,  and  no  independent  political  institutions  have  been  created  for  their
control. At the same time, the building up of a counter-ideology, of a bulwark against the
political liberalism and pluralism of the West, continued. 
3. The renaissance of traditional Chinese thought, especially of Neo-Confucianism, seems to
support a rising ethnic and cultural nationalism, and not necessary political liberalism and
democracy. (In this, there is some similarity to the partial modernisation of Germany as a
“delayed  nation”  in  the  second  part  of  the  nineteenth  and  first  part  of  the  twentieth
centuries and its anti-Western and anti-liberal ideologies.) 
4. However, the quantity of translations and Chinese studies on Western thought since the
1980s represents a phenomenal feat by Chinese intellectuals, and it is no exaggeration to
speak of the beginning of a new chapter in the intellectual history of China and its dealing
with Western ideas.  This  is,  together  with  the  “recovering”  of  the  Chinese  past,  a  very
positive aspect. Although Marxism-Leninism and Maoism still  prevail on the surface, the
foundations of other systems of thought have been laid down and have started to exert their
long-lasting influence. The pluralist nature of the intellectual discourse is no longer stifled
by a closed system of thought as it was in the past. Chinese scholars have started recovering
their philosophical tradition, and, in comparing it  with the West,  they are building new
cultural identities in their search for modernity. Moreover, there is reason to hope that the
continuous study of Western philosophy in China, and of Chinese philosophy in the West,
will lead to a common understanding that basic modes of thinking can be found in both
cultures, and that these can be used to establish the foundations for a better intellectual
discourse in the future. 
5. The  attempts  to  apply  some  modes  of  Western  thought  do  not  necessarily  imply  a
rapprochement between China and the West, in which the fundamental political values of
Western democracy and parliamentarianism will eventually be adopted in something like a
“democracy with Chinese characteristics,” as has happened in Taiwan. On the contrary, one
cannot rule out that the traditional anti-Western ideology in China will become an amalgam
consisting of Confucian elements, combined with set pieces of Party ideology, anti-Western,
non-liberal philosophy, and based on an ethnic, or even, racist identity. Under the slogans of
“patriotism”  and  “Chineseness,”  such  a  nationalistic  ideology  could  be  used  by  the
leadership to present itself as the core of the “Chinese nation,” which, in addition to the Han
people, would automatically include the official minorities, the Taiwanese, Hong Kongers,
and overseas Chinese. 
68 The rising nationalist rhetoric and the attempts to create a collective Chinese identity
among all of these different groups is a threat to their individual ethnic and cultural
identities. It is this official policy that forces the minorities to rediscover and redefine
their own identities, and which arouses national feeling among them. A solution to the
clash  between conflicting  cultural  and  national  identities  in  China  could  lie  in  the
development of a multi-ethnic nationalism that is based on the principles of political
liberalism. However, this would mean the adoption of the second “half of modernity.” 
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ABSTRACTS
The paper describes and analyzes crucial elements of cultural and national identity-building in
China from the 19th century to the present:  the unfolding of  the identity crisis  following its
repeated defeats by Western powers in the 19th century and the attempts of China’s intellectual
elite to develop a new cultural and national identity. The paper also deals with the main currents
of  identity-building and the perception of  the  West  since  the  1980s  by  discussing the  rising
importance of Confucianism, the role of history and language, and the renaissance of Western
thought after the decline of Marxism-Leninism. Finally, the focus will be on the emergence of
different  types  of  Chinese  nationalism  since  the  19th century  and  the  recent  discourse  on
nationalism. 
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